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Over the last few decades, research, policy, and practice in the field of mental health care and a complementary variety of social
work and social service delivery have internationally concentrated on recovery as a promising concept. In this paper, a conceptual
distinction is made between an individual approach and a social approach to recovery, and underlying assumptions of citizenship
and interrelated notions and features of care and support are identified. It is argued that the conditionality of the individual
approach to recovery refers to a conceptualization of citizenship as normative, based on the existence of a norm that operates in
every domain of our society. We argue that these assumptions place a burden of self-governance on citizens with mental health
problems and risk producing people with mental health problems as nonrecyclable citizens. The social approach to recovery
embraces a diﬀerent conceptualization of citizenship as relational and inclusive and embodies the myriad ways in which the
belonging of people with mental health problems can be constructed in practice. As such, we hope to enable social services and
professionals in the field to balance their role in the provision of care and support to service users with mental health problems.
1. Introduction
In the field of (mental) health care and a complementary
variety of social work and social service delivery, the
emergence of new understandings and paradigms of care
and support for people with mental health problems has
been observed over the last few decades [1–4]. Since the
mid-1980s, research, policy, and practice have internationally
concentrated on recovery as an inspiring concept [1, 5–10].
The recovery paradigmwas considered to be a promising and
innovative framework [6, 11] that justified the deinstitution-
alization of residential services over the last few decades [12,
13] and has enabled an increasing emphasis on developing
community-based services in diﬀerent Western welfare states
[13–19]. This development has been associated with the
emergence of new ideas about citizenship, focusing on the
right of people with mental health problems to live on equal
terms in mainstream society and promoting social inclusion
in the community [4]. As discussed by Peck et al. [20, page
442], these ideas have challenged both traditional service
structures and the authority of the “professional narrative
about the nature of, and responses to, mental distress.”
Quite recently it has been argued, however, that there is
an urgent need for conceptual clarity about what constitutes
recovery-oriented practice [9, 21], since “key knowledge gaps
have been identified as the need for clarity about the under-
pinning philosophy of recovery” [21, page 449]. In many
Western countries, the ambiguity of the emerging concept of
recovery inmental health has “createdmajor dilemmas about
how to develop adequate (. . .) community-based services in
the context of recurring financial underfunding” [19, page
426]. The central issue implies how mental health systems
and services can support the recovery process [1, 2]. In this
paper, based on a comprehensive review of the recovery lit-
erature and recent empirical research [22–25], a conceptual
distinction is made between an individual approach and a
social approach to recovery. First, we will outline the scope
of the recovery paradigm. Second, underlying assumptions
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of citizenship and interrelated notions and features of care
and support are identified in each of these approaches to
recovery. As Slade [2, page 703] recently asserted, the domain
of promoting citizenship among individuals in recovery “has
been the least investigated, and yet, plausibly, it is the most
influential. Improving social inclusion and community inte-
gration requires clinicians (and social service professions)
to pay more attention to supporting the person to make
connections and to the creation of inclusive communities.”
2. The Scope of the Recovery Paradigm
The recovery movement grew in the realms of the self-
help and deinstitutionalization movement in the 1960s and
1970s, when ideas about promoting a life in the community
and providing adequate care and support were increasingly
developing a broad social base [5, 26, 27]. Since the mid-
1980s, an impressive body of knowledge about mental
health recovery has been generated from the perspectives
and experiences of service users, family members, and
mental health and social work professionals [21, 28–34].
The recovery paradigm rejects the assumption that being
diagnosed with—even chronic—mental health problems is
inevitably considered a tragic catastrophe and the cause
of becoming a social outcast [35], and an attempt is
made to “reach beyond our storehouse of writings that
describe psychiatric disorder as a catastrophic life event”
[33, page 335]. Although there are many perceptions and
definitions of recovery, William Anthony, Director of the
Boston Center for Psychiatric Rehabilitation, introduces a
cornerstone definition of mental health recovery, identifying
recovery as “a deeply personal, unique process of changing
one’s attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills and/or roles. It
is a way of living a satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life,
even with limitations caused by illness. Recovery involves the
development of newmeaning and purpose in one’s life as one
grows beyond the catastrophic eﬀects of mental illness” [5,
page 27]. As an approach that constitutes a branch of the
comprehensive family of strengths-based perspectives [36],
the key themes and ingredients in the academic literature
base, including published first-person recovery narrative
accounts, can be identified as embracing strengths rather
than weaknesses, hope rather than despair, and engagement
and active participation in life rather than withdrawal and
isolation [2, 6, 21, 31, 33]. At first glance, the recovery
discourse explains recovery in terms of a journey of hope
[31], consisting of a lifelong, individual process in which
the individual takes back control, gets on with his/her life
[37], and (re)integrates into the social world [38]. In a
nutshell, recovery is grafted onto empowering service users
with mental health problems to stimulate their personal
growth and responsibility [35].
In what follows, we focus on diﬀerent conceptual notions
of recovery and on the complicated issues and dilemmas that
are emerging concerning the ways in which care and support
can be provided by professionals [13, 19], as it is stated that
social service professionals play a pivotal role in supporting
service users with mental health problems in their recovery
[1, 2, 17]. In the extensive body of recovery literature, we
identify and distinguish an individual and a social approach
to recovery. In our conceptual analysis, these diﬀerent con-
ceptualizations of recovery intrinsically construct diﬀerent
notions of citizenship and imply disabling as well as enabling
features of care and support oﬀered by professionals in social
service delivery. In the individual approach to recovery, an
underlying notion of normative citizenship is persistently at
work, implying a residual perspective on care and support
services. In the social approach to recovery, an underlying
notion of relational and inclusive citizenship is uncovered,
enabling a structural perspective on care and support services.
3. An Individual Approach to Recovery
In both theory and practice, stressing the service user’s
responsibility appears to be a central component in the
empowering process of recovery [39]. According to Deegan
[31, page 2], for example, recovery involves enabling people
with mental health problems to “regain control over their
lives, and (. . .) be responsible for their own individual jour-
ney of recovery.” Recently, mental health experts formulated
a working definition of recovery as a person-driven process:
“self-determination and self-direction are the foundations
for recovery as individuals define their own life goals and
design their unique path(s) towards those goals. Individuals
optimize their autonomy and independence to the greatest
extent possible by leading, controlling, and exercising choice
over the services and supports that assist their recovery and
resilience. In so doing, they are empowered and provided the
resources tomake informed decisions, initiate recovery, build
on their strengths, and gain or regain control over their lives”
[40]. The majority of recovery-oriented researchers and
practitioners emphasize that recovery involves a resurgence
of a coherent sense of self and of personal responsibility for
one’s own state of being in the process of social reintegration
[41, 42]. In that vein, the work of recovery-oriented profes-
sionals revolves around a logic of empowerment to stimulate
personal growth [43]. Craig [44, page 126] formulates the
recovery-oriented task of the services as “a matter of doing
as much as possible to empower the individual. The aim is
to have consumers assume more and more responsibility for
themselves. Their particular responsibilities include develop-
ing goals, working with providers and others—for example,
family and friends—to make plans for reaching these goals,
taking on decision-making tasks, and engaging in self-care.
In addition, responsibility is a factor in making choices
and taking risks; full empowerment requires that consumers
live with the consequences of their choices.” As Jacobson and
Greenley [38, page 483] state, “empowerment emerges from
inside one’s self—although it may be facilitated by external
conditions.”
In the most favorable and far-reaching view, the indi-
vidual approach to recovery suggests that people with
mental health problems individually have to take “personal
responsibility through self-management, being responsible
for your own well-being” [1, page 268]. As Slade [2, page
703] asserts, “the central shift in a recovery-oriented system,
therefore, involves seeing an individual not as a patient—
someone who is fundamentally diﬀerent and therefore needs
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treatment before getting on with life—but as a person
whose eﬀorts to live the most fulfilling life possible are
fundamentally similar to those of people without mental
illness.” Nevertheless, although the recovery paradigm is
heretical within the dominant biomedical model [33, 39],
“the fashionable concept of ‘recovery’ can be a two-edged
sword” (Hopton, [12, pp. 65-66]). As Hopton [12, pp. 65-
66] argues aptly, “on one level, it represents a step away
from the once prevalent idea that (. . .) only compliance
to medication will prevent a relapse. On the other hand,
(sometimes) it also seems to have medical overtones.” In
clinical conceptualizations, for example, it is stated that
recovery implies that it is possible to regain control of one’s
life, to reintegrate socially and become independent [41],
and to “return to a normal or healthy state, free of the
symptoms of illness, (. . .) being able to work, to go to college,
to live in ordinary housing, have an active recreational
life and find friendship and romance” [44, page 125, our
italics]. This clinical and diagnostic emphasis on diﬀerence
and intrapsychic deficits that should be overcome by the
individual who is engaging in self-care and expected to
recover from an illness and regaining a coherent sense of
self is a long-standing criticism of the mental health system.
These insights inherently refer to underlying assumptions of
citizenship.
3.1. Normative Citizenship. There are substantial objections
to the idea of individual responsibility “as part of the
quest for the model citizen” [45, page 72]. The recovery
paradigm can be sharply criticized because of the socially
constructed norm of the self-managing, self-suﬃcient, and
independent consumer-citizen who is fully responsible for
his/her own choices [24]. A conceptualization of citizenship
as normative implies that citizenship is perceived as a status
and an achievement [46], mainly based on a norm of active
and “good” citizenship that is imposed on individuals and
persistently at work in both discourse and practice [23]. In
this normative notion of citizenship that promotes “projects
of the self” [47], people with mental health problems are
expected to become self-suﬃcient and productive citizens
within the scope of self-responsibility, as the responsibility
for leading a fulfilling life is individualized [48]. As such,
“citizenship becomes conditional on individuals (. . .) cit-
izens have no rights but responsibilities, and rights shift
into social obligations” [23, page 100]. As Rose [49, page
230] observed, “individuals are to become, as it were,
entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through
the choices they make among the forms of life available to
them.” The recovery paradigm can be understood against
this background, cultivating a project of self-development
and self-improvement [47] and enabling societies to make
“technologies of opportunity and self-government in the
hopes of activating a vital, entrepreneurial and enterprising
spirit among (their) subjects” operational [50, page 92].
It becomes particularly tricky when this ideology of
individual choice and opportunity denies the fact that some
citizens have few available choices and resources [46], while
at the same time implying that so-called “responsible citizens
make reasonable choices and, therefore, ‘bad choices’ result
from the wilfulness of irresponsible people” [51]. Recovery
implies “a danger of running too close to contemporary
neoliberal notions of self-help and self-responsibility and
glossing over the structural inequalities that hamper personal
and social development” [52, page 10]. This logic masks
the restricted role of the advanced liberal welfare state
[53] in guaranteeing the right to an existence in human
dignity, and in pursuing social justice. Although the notion
of ideal citizens as choice-making, self-directing, and self-
governing subjects in the advanced liberal welfare state is
based on individual autonomy and self-responsibility, it lies
equally well at the heart of disciplinary control [54, 55].
As Goodley [45, pp. 72-73] argues aptly, a strange paradox
emerges for disabled people, including people with mental
health problems: “while they are cast as the dependent other,
when they do attempt to gain a foothold on the ladder of
individualism then they are expected to demonstrate extra-
special, hyper-individual forms of being in order to maintain
their place (. . . being) more normal than normal people. (. . .)
And if disabled people fail, then a host of professionals lie
in wait to aid and (re)habilitate their journey towards self-
containment.” This underlying dynamic refers to the ways
in which the provision of care and support is coined by
professionals and social services.
3.2. Residual Perspective on Care and Support. The recovery
paradigm clearly requires a reconceptualization of how social
services are (re)organized and delivered [1, 2]. In our view,
however, the individual approach to recovery leads easily to
residual practices, implying that professionals are expected to
empower people with mental health problems in becoming
autonomous and self-suﬃcient citizens, without providing
the proper care and support and resources to create fulfilling
lives on a structural base. It has been widely observed
that minority, marginal, disabled, and chronically ill people
might already bear heavy caring responsibilities, but that
they also have the fewest social resources and might not
be the best risk managers [47]. As citizens, people with
mental health problems have the right to be oﬀered care
and support, but they do not always fit the support models
that make an appeal to the service user’s responsibility,
“whereby everything would be controlled to the point of
self-sustenance, without the need for intervention” [56, page
241]. If the delivery of social services is based on a logic of
self-responsibility and self-management of service users with
mental health problems, social service professionals might be
treading on a tightrope, since they are charged with “motivat-
ing and cajoling service users towards projects of autonomy
and self-development, while controlling the deviant and
destructive aspects of resistance strategies (crime, drugs,
benefit fraud, self-harm,mental illness)” [47, page 10]. Social
service professionals’ preoccupation with empowerment and
individual responsibility of service users with mental health
problems has been criticized for downplaying and devaluing
the provision of care and support [3, 45]. In that light,
Rose [53] refers to the privatization of risk, which concerns
people who do not, and cannot, live up to the expectations of
becoming self-responsible in managing their mental health
and other social problems, which creates “a division of
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the population into those who are capable of managing
risk and those whose riskiness requires management under
what might be called a tutelary relationship, a division that
might be expressed as one between the ‘civilized’ and the
‘marginalized”’ [57]. As soon as individual citizens cannot
prove that they are able to participate in the societal game
as self-governing entrepreneurs, they become the objects of
intensified surveillance, control, and disciplinary practices
[13, 19, 51, 58]. The tendency to transform the responsibility
for social risks into a problem of “self-care” inherently
contributes to the individualization, decontextualization,
and depoliticization of social problems [59].
In that vein, the notion of the ideal citizen marginalizes
“competing conceptions of the citizen-subject” [60, page
291] and constructs and transforms some citizens gradually
into members of a residual category of nonrecyclable and
nondeserving citizens who become waste products in society
[61]. Clarke [51, page 453] introduces the conception of the
abandoned citizen, which unveils “the dynamics of activation,
empowerment and responsibilization as rhetorical, masking
the real dynamic of abandonment” of residual social prac-
tices, in which chiefly an economic rationality is brought
to bear on social problems [48]. This residual approach
turns social policy into an instrument for rationing services
into risk assessment rather than furnishing better care and
support, due to scarce resources that are covered under the
veil of autonomy, choice, and empowerment [47]. Following
this line of thought, the conception of self-managing citizens
is a means of reducing costs and pressures on social service
systems, as they become “expert patients” and create mutual
self-help, take on managing their own lifestyles and well-
being, and require less direct attention from residential
(and more expensive) services since they learn to embrace
the spirit of “do-it-yourself” [51]. The focus lies on the
definition of prestructured criteria for access to care and
support, and only those “worthy” of care—those who are
willing to learn to play the game of self-responsibility—are
allowed into the system. Such a vision of humanity threatens
to individualize social life, changing individuals rather than
society, and fails to support people in their social contexts.
From Clarke’s [51, page 453] point of view, this version of
“responsibility appears as a smokescreen behind which the
state is systematically divesting its responsibilities,” includ-
ing dismantling social services and particularly residential
services that are subsidized by the state. Hence, the focus
of recovery lies on the characteristics of people with mental
health problems, rather than on the policy and organization
of the support system [62].
4. A Social Approach to Recovery
In the extensive body of recovery literature, rather infre-
quently a social approach to recovery is identified that covers
diﬀerent connotations [2, 8, 10, 63–66]. In embracing the
social nature of recovery, of crucial importance is the finding
that recovery processes cannot be forced into a cookbook
full of recipes for everyone to follow, since recovery often
consists of a turbulent process of ups and downs, given
the heterogeneous situations of people with mental health
problems, implying that “the manifestation and course of
their mental illness are unique to them and often non-linear”
[11, page 887]. As Ridgway [33, page 339] asserts, “recovery is
not linear, the journey is not made up of a specific succession
of stages or accomplishments, and it does not follow a
straight course. Instead, recovery is an evolving process, one
that sometimes spirals back upon itself, and may result in a
frustrating return to active disorder.” In that light, Whitwell
[63, page 621] refers to the myth of recovery, meaning
“being restored to your former state (. . .) as a state of a
person, as the end state following a period of illness.” As an
exploration of the experiences of people with mental health
problems shows that people are conscious of their impaired
life position, describing “unemployment, divorce, housing
problems, lack of money and social isolation” [63, page 622],
a conceptual shift implies moving into a nuanced and social
understanding of recovery. Also, Tew et al. [10, page 444,
our italics] have recently revealed that recovery “emphasises
rebuilding a worthwhile life, irrespective of whether or not
one may continue to have particular distress experiences—and
central to this can be reclaiming valued social roles. (. . .)
Recovery may involve a journey both of personal change and
of social (re)engagement—which highlights the importance
of creating accepting and enabling social environments within
which recovery may be supported.” Secker et al. [64, page 410,
our italics] describe a reconceptualization of recovery that
is “viewed as establishing a dynamic and meaningful life
with an impairment (. . .), the process of recovery involves
the reintroduction of the individual into a socially accepting
and acceptable environment.” According to Slade [2, page
703], this social approach to recovery can be summarized
as “recovery begins when you find someone or something
to relate to. The job of the system is to support the rela-
tionship (. . .), maintaining an organizational commitment
to recovery, and promoting citizenship among individuals in
recovery.” In our view, these insights refer to the necessity to
consider notions and interpretations of citizenship in these
social practices as relational and inclusive.
4.1. Relational and Inclusive Citizenship. In reality, our
societies are often characterized by the dynamics of social
exclusion andmarginalization [67]. The experience of people
with mental health problems of not being recognized as
citizens is frequently identified [21, 30–34] and refers to the
discrepancy between their formal citizenship (embodied as
an entitlement and a status) and their de facto citizenship
(constructed through the experience of being a member of
a particular community and society in practice) [46]. Lawy
and Biesta [68, page 43] refer to a notion of citizenship
articulated as relational and inclusive that does not presume
that people move through a prespecified trajectory into their
citizenship status/achievement as “good” and contributing
citizens, yet “it is inclusive rather than exclusive because it
assumes that everyone in society (. . .) are citizens who simply
move through citizenship-as-practice, from the cradle to the
grave.” Pols [69] introduced the concept of relational citizen-
ship, which diﬀers radically from normative citizenship, as
it “develops in the relationship between people, embedded
in a set of relational questions, interests and concerns”
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[23, page 103]. Winance [70] observes that, in practices of
citizenship in which normalization processes are challenged
from the position of an alignment to work on the norm,
the societal norm gets problematized on a collective level. In
that vein, inclusive citizenship implies that “themain compo-
nents of citizenship—membership and belonging, the rights
and obligations that flow from that membership, and equal-
ity of status—(. . .) should all apply to all citizens equally” [71,
page 4]. In this perspective, citizenship is shaped through
relations where norms have to be renegotiated, performed,
refreshed, and reestablished in each situation [23]. As such,
rights and responsibilities are actualized and constantly
renegotiated through (inter)actions in which contradiction
and temporary consensus are vital elements [72]. In this
frame of reference, the value of care and support depends
on the ongoing engagement of professionals in shaping the
relationship between the citizen withmental health problems
and everyday society as the terrain of interactions with other
people, based on an assumption of interdependency and
joint responsibility which is redefined in every situation
[73].
4.2. Structural Perspective on Care and Support. According to
Beresford and Croft [16], an alliance between service users
with mental health problems and professionals is likely to be
the most productive way forward for securing the interests
of both. Here the question of what care and support mean
for people with mental health problems in everyday life plays
a pivotal role and requires a continuous dialogue between
the client and the professional [23]. Borg and Davidson [73,
page 139] stress that supporting people with mental health
problems to exercise all of the rights and responsibilities
involved in citizenship is the key implication for practice,
as “living conditions, income, employment/unemployment,
and social interactions outside of treatment settings are
central to processes of recovery and cannot be seen as lying
outside of the scope of clinical or rehabilitative practice.” In
that vein, responsibility might be approached as the ability
to respond [74], based on the recognition of the fundamental
elements of community in which every citizen should have
the opportunity to participate: housing, education, income,
and work [75].
However, we also want to address implications at the
level of social service provision. In a structural perspective on
support services, the focus shifts from prestructured criteria
of access to the criteria of qualitative social support [76, 77].
These criteria question the ways in which organizations are
structured and function in relation to a diversity of clients
and problems as well as in relation to those clients and
problems that remain oﬀ the picture in a residual perspective
because they do not manage to become self-suﬃcient
citizens. According to this theoretical frame of reference,
five interrelated features need to be constructed as leverages
for (more) equality and quality, defined as availability,
accessibility, aﬀordability, usefulness, and comprehensibility
[72].
(i) Availability refers to the existence of a supply and to
the fact that social services can also be called upon
for matters that do not necessarily relate directly to
the assessed problem.
(ii) Accessibility refers to the (lack of) thresholds when
care is needed, for instance an inadequate knowledge
of the supply.
(iii) Aﬀordability refers to financial and other costs that
the client may encounter, for instance giving up
one’s privacy or the negative social and psychological
consequences of an intervention.
(iv) Usefulness refers to the extent to which the client
experiences the care as supportive: is the help attuned
to the demand, the skills, and the language of the
client?
(v) Comprehensibility refers to the extent to which
clients are aware of the reasons for the intervention
and the way in which the problem should be
approached.
This implies that the welfare state should develop a
diﬀerentiated supply of social services that oﬀers all its
citizens, in a diversity of situations, the scope to develop
their full potential from a structural perspective on care and
support [72].
5. Conclusion
The concept of recovery can be interpreted against the
background of the processes of change in social service
systems in many developed countries since the mid-1980s.
In this paper, we aimed to explore the pitfalls and the
opportunities of the recovery paradigm in relation to these
changing service organizations, based on underlying notions
of citizenship of people with mental health problems. On the
one hand, an individual approach to recovery is identified,
undergirded by a neoliberal and normative conception of
citizenship, which conceives citizenship as circumscribing
the domain of the active entrepreneurial spirit [51]. Those
service users with mental health problems who are provided
with care and support are committed to act as responsible
and reasonably enterprising citizens. In this conception
of normative citizenship, these issues are seen as natural,
uncontested, and incontestable, and they risk to range people
out as nonrecyclable and abandoned citizens [61]. On the
other hand, we reclaim a social approach to recovery that
implies a conception of relational and inclusive citizenship
[22, 23, 70, 71]. This conceptualization of citizenship
oﬀers new perspectives for both people with mental health
problems and social service professionals, since the debate
continues about the actualization of citizenship, about the
conditions in which people are expected to lead a dignified
life in the community, and about the care and support
needed. A high-quality supply of social services that is made
usable for all its citizens needs to be provided by the welfare
state [72].
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